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Abstract—In recent years, the use and suitability of drones
for many applications, including surveillance, search and rescue,
research, agriculture and civil engineering, has greatly increased
due to their improved affordability and improved functionality.
However, low-cost consumer drones are rarely designed to work
in fleets, which limits the applications for which business, research
and individuals may deploy such drones. Proprietary, commercial
and bespoke options are available at higher cost and existing
solutions providing fleet functionality have limited security, if
any, which excludes their use for sensitive applications. In
this paper, we discuss the repurposing of consumer off-the-
shelf (COTS) drones for use in secured fleets and provide the
design, implementation and evaluation of a complete approach for
creating end-to-end secured fleets of consumer drones (SFCD).
We present a protocol for securing communications within
fleets whilst employing more efficient symmetric key crypto-
graphy throughout to reduce the impact of our security on the
limited and resource-constrained COTS drones—exploiting the
characteristics of a fleet with an online and central ground control
station, which may act as a key distribution centre. The protocol
allows an arbitrary number of channels to be established to
authenticate and optionally encrypt real-time data transmitted
on these channels. We also discuss routing in fleets, as well
as the control and monitoring of them, to allow SFCD to be
fully deployed—providing an extensive and thorough solution.
Our experimental evaluation confirms the suitability of low-cost
consumer drones for use in SFCD, with flight time impacted by
only 9.9% and worst-case bandwidth of 4.7Mibit/s.
I. INTRODUCTION
The market for consumer drones, or Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs), is booming; facilitated by the continual
improvement in their hardware and software—and ever-
decreasing prices. Major vendors such as DJI and Parrot
are offering high-quality consumer drones for as low as 300
USD, equipped with high-quality video cameras, powerful
processors, batteries supporting flights of up to 30 minutes,
and a range of sensors for safe flight operations (e.g. collision
avoidance, obstacle detection). The current consumer market is
focused on providing easy-to-use, out-of-the-box command and
control functionality for safe operation of individual drones,
controlled manually using R/C controllers or using smartphone
applications, such as Parrot’s FreeFlightPro1, connected to the
drones via Wi-Fi. The latter offer more sophisticated means of
semi-automated control using flightpaths and way points based
on GPS coordinates.
In contrast, the majority of current and future business
applications, in particular involving surveillance/monitoring
in search and rescue operations, land surveying, ecological
1https://www.parrot.com/us/freeflight-pro
research, agriculture and civil engineering, require command
and control systems that are able to support multiple UAVs
operating in a centrally-managed fleet, i.e. controlled by some
operator from the Ground Control Station (GCS). Such func-
tionality is currently not widely available on consumer drones;
hence businesses are forced to resort to commercial providers
offering bespoke and more expensive fleet management systems.
The restrictive costs of commercial solutions and the current
limitations on the use of consumer drones in fleets makes it
hard for businesses to adopt drone technologies.
To this end, extending the functionality of low-cost consumer
drones to support fleet operations would be an attractive
proposition—especially if these changes can be limited to
the software only. A number of open source projects, such
as PaparazziUAV2 and ArduCopter3, have been developed
to provide extendable command and control functionality
for enthusiasts who build their own drones. Most of these
projects also support various consumer off-the-shelf drones
by replacing their native software. However, the required
support for fleet operations in these projects is limited:
PaparazziUAV offers support for multiple drones, but uses its
own communication protocol to control the drones—restricting
users to just the PaparazziUAV ecosystem. ArduCopter uses
a more popular communication protocol, MAVLink4, whose
specification supports multiple drones based on unique system
identifiers, allowing for a wide range of MAVLink-compatible
GCS software to be employed. Despite this, GCS software
available is often not designed with fleet-centric control in
mind due to the single-drone, single-controller approach taken
for many consumer drones currently on offer.
Besides, these projects provide only limited support for
securing communications between two drones or a drone and its
GCS. For instance, S-PPRZLINK5 secures the execution of the
PaparazziUAV’s communication protocol, PPRZLINK, between
two entities using public key cryptography. This approach
would not scale well in a centrally-managed fleet environment.
In academic literature, several proposals focused on securing
communications between drones without considering the wider
aspects of a fleet management system such as networking
and mission control. For example, Won et al. [1] designed
a new key management protocol for UAVs supporting key
agreement, non-repudiation, and revocation based on certificate-
2http://wiki.paparazziuav.org/wiki/Main Page
3http://ardupilot.org/copter/
4https://mavlink.io/en/guide/serialization.html
5http://wiki.paparazziuav.org/wiki/Pprzlink
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less signcryption and key encapsulation. Zouhri et al. [2]
proposed an architecture for secure key management, access
control and data transfer between the entities of a fleet, yet
without actual protocols to instantiate the architecture. Blazy
et al. [3] used streams of one-time keys derived from a shared
key to protect messages exchanged between a drone and the
GCS. Maxa et al. [4] focused on highly dynamic UAV ad-hoc
networks and explored the use of various routing protocols
(including AODV, OLSR and DSR) and their security in this
context. We observe that typical consumer drones do not
provide native support for these routing protocols; out of the
box, these drones are typically configured to serve as IEEE
802.11 access points (APs) in master mode.
At the moment there is no complete system that addresses
the different aspects of building secure fleets of drones and
proposes solutions for managing the fleet and its missions.
Our contribution: In this work we design, implement
and evaluate a complete system, called SFCD, for secure man-
agement of fleets built from low-cost off-the-shelf consumer
drones. Our SFCD system does not require any hardware
modifications to the drones and comes with GCS software that
provides centralised fleet-centric control for missions involving
up to tens of consumer drones.
Each drone in the fleet is configured with an independent
(symmetric) cryptographic key that it shares with the GCS. For
each mission, the GCS and each participating drone establish
several independent end-to-end secure channels, which are used
to transmit different types of messages, including dedicated
channels for control messages, telemetry data, and application
payload data (e.g. video streams). The underlying SFCD
handshake protocol uses provably secure lightweight mutual
authentication protocol from [5] by Bellare and Rogaway,
extended with derivation of channel-specific session keys. The
actual transmission of messages over these channels is secured
with the state-of-the-art authenticated encryption scheme from
[6] that supports authentication of additional data. In our system,
the GCS can also be used to enable secure communication
between any two drones participating in a mission. For this
purpose, the GCS acts as a key distribution centre and securely
transmits a fresh shared key to these drones—enabling them to
execute the SFCD handshake and set up their own independent
secure channels if required.
In terms of networking, our SFCD system establishes
an IEEE 802.11 ad-hoc network between the drones and
the GCS. The lack of support for routing protocols for ad-
hoc networking in consumer drones is compensated by the
deployment of efficient application-layer routing, in which the
GCS dynamically sets the required routes to ensure that each
drone maintains its connectivity to the GCS. Packets sent along
multi-hop paths are additionally authenticated by a path key,
distributed by the GCS which acts as a key distribution centre.
Our SFCD system uses its own addressing system for
the drones and a dedicated application-layer protocol header
that has been designed to establish, protect, and maintain all
communication channels. This header is seen as ‘additional
data’ and is protected by the underlying channel security
mechanisms.
The designed SFCD system has been implemented in a
modular way, in which a standalone program runs alongside
other software on the drone, such as PaparazziUAV, to provide
secure communications according to our protocol and has been
practically evaluated using the popular Parrot Bebop 26 drone.
Our experiments attest to the practicality of our SFCD system
and its suitability for monitoring/surveillance applications. The
conducted experiments show that our SFCD solution with its
security protocols has only minor impact on the battery power
consumption, leading to a 9.9% reduction in flight time in
comparison to the original PaparazziUAV software running on
its own, and achieves throughputs of at least 4.7Mibit/s over
distances of up to 260m per drone—capable of supporting
real-time video streaming at the default quality and frame rate.
Organisation: The rest of the paper is organised as follows.
In Section II, we describe the main architecture, components
and requirements of a general system for the centralised control
of a Fleet of Drones (FoD). In Section III, we introduce the
design of our SFCD system, focusing on the engineering aspects
behind software modification for consumer drones, using the
example of Parrot Bebop 2 drones, and the realisation of
all system components, including provision of security and
routing mechanisms. This section contains specifications of the
SFCD handshake, channel establishment protocols, application-
layer routing and definition of the packet structure used in all
SFCD communications. Section IV experimentally evaluates
the performance of the SFCD system, including its impact on
battery power consumption and quality of communication links
over distances, and discusses the suitability of the system for
monitoring/surveillance applications requiring real-time data
streaming.
II. FLEETS OF DRONES—SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND
REQUIREMENTS
Our work focuses on fleets of UAVs. Based on the classi-
fication by Akram et al. in [7], for a Fleet of Drones (FoD),
we consider up to tens of UAVs acting on instruction from
a central operator, a GCS, with human oversight and some
limited autonomy—such as flying to specific GPS coordinates.
This differs from a drone swarm, which is a group of fully-
autonomous UAVs employing swarm intelligence with little to
no human oversight. Our work is centred on such fleets due to
their potential use for current and future business applications.
In the following section we discuss the main characteristics,
architecture and requirements for FoDs, including their control
systems and communications.
A. FoD Components
An FoD command and control system consists of the
following components which work together to form a fleet
architecture, exemplified in Figure 1.
6https://www.parrot.com/us/drones/parrot-bebop-2
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GCS
Ground segment
Mission B
Mission A
Communication link
Groundside network
Figure 1: Example of a UAV fleet7
GCS: In an FoD, the GCS is the logical central controller
for all UAVs in the fleet. The GCS has situational awareness
regarding all actions performed by a fleet, including the
status, location and connectivity of its UAVs. A fleet GCS is
designed to provide seamless secure command and monitoring
of multiple UAVs simultaneously.
Typical GCS software allows UAVs to be programmed with
flight plans and controlled from a control station. Specifically,
these programs provide a GUI that allows the operator to:
• view real-time UAV data (telemetry), such as battery,
position, and orientation;
• instruct UAVs to fly to a single or set of GPS
coordinate(s)—forming a flightpath; and,
• control UAVs manually using a joystick or game control-
ler.8
GCS hardware consists of a computer or computers running
GCS software; operators use this to control and monitor the
fleet. In Figure 1, the example GCS uses a gateway machine
which acts as the demarcation point between the GCS and
the rest of the groundside network. This gateway machine
may run GCS server software; allowing multiple computers,
used by fleet operators, to connect using GCS client software.
Alternative approaches may incorporate multiple servers to
manage fleet management workstations—or simply a single
machine, such as a laptop, running both the operator’s interface
and integrated GCS software.
7Iconography: icons8.com
8In a traditional consumer UAV system, manual control is often provided
through a groundside R/C safety link.
The PaparazziUAV project, an open-source ecosystem of
UAV and GCS software, produces software which provides
a messaging protocol, graphical interfaces for operators, a
datalink program to manage communication channels and
server software for handling communications between GCS
instances. QGroundControl9 and APM Planner 210 are examples
of GCS software which support the MAVLink UAV and GCS
communications protocol.
UAVs: Typical drone hardware consists of a number of
components, such as inertial measurement units (IMUs), GPS
receivers, cameras, motors, batteries, wireless radios, optical-
flow sensors, ultrasound sensors and pressure sensors—as well
as the airframe and propellers.
UAV software often consists primarily of autopilot software
which manages flight operation, including:
• monitoring and acting on sensor data by adjusting motor
output or current action;
• reporting status to GCS (telemetry);
• flying to specified GPS coordinate(s) and maintaining
position;
• returning to specified location when conditions are met
(e.g. returning to launch after elapsed time); and,
• interpreting roll, pitch, yaw and throttle values from
joystick input on GCS, or R/C controller, and altering
motor output accordingly.
PaparazziUAV provides autopilot software for use with the
rest of their ecosystem, which is supported on a number
9http://qgroundcontrol.com/
10http://ardupilot.org/planner2/
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of platforms. ArduPilot is a MAVLink-compatible autopilot,
suitable for use with MAVLink GCS software.
Ground network and FoD communications: The ground
network uses communication hardware to create the groundside
and ground-to-air networks. Network infrastructure may be used
as part of the GCS when multiple machines are used to manage
the fleet. In Figure 1, two wireless APs are used to form the
ground-to-air network and a wired network for the groundside
network. This includes the GCS which uses the groundside
network to allow communication between operator machines
and the gateway server. Alternatively, a single machine with
a wireless network interface card (NIC) may form the entire
GCS and groundside network.
The GCS uses the groundside network for groundside
component communication and the ground-to-air network for
communicating with UAVs through telemetry (downlink) and
uplink channels, provided by the relevant wireless hardware
(e.g., IEEE 802.11 APs).
Fleet UAVs form a mesh (ad-hoc) network to facilitate
communication over a larger geographical area. In Figure 1,
UAVs not in range of the groundside APs are served by
other UAVs in range of the existing network via multi-hop
communication links.
Standard communication channels formed between the GCS
and each UAV include downlink (telemetry—UAV status),
uplink/datalink (control), and other channels such as video or
sensor data streams. To send commands to UAVs and receive
status updates, protocols such as MAVLink, PaparazziUAV’s
PPRZLINK or proprietary protocols are used. These protocols
are usually not protected—a notable exception is the S-
PPRZLINK, a security add-on for PPRZLINK, which uses
elliptic curve cryptography, namely Curve25519 [8] key ex-
change, Ed25519 [9] digital signature, and ChaCha20-Poly1305
[10] authenticated encryption scheme. Instead of S-PPRZLINK,
we use our approach presented in Section III-E1—which uses
preshared keys and the GCS as a key distribution centre—due
to its simplicity, superior efficiency and better suitability for
FoDs given the low number of drones and available connectivity
with the GCS.
B. Mission Phases
A typical FoD mission consists of four main phases. The
fleet may be engaged in multiple simultaneous missions; in
Figure 1, we show two missions running concurrently. Missions
do not require their UAVs to all be in the same phase at any
given time.
a) Configuration: Networking, communication channels,
software and keys are configured on the GCS and UAVs.
Autopilot software is installed on UAVs if necessary. This
phase should only be completed once for each component of
the fleet, after which these components may be reused for
many future missions.
b) Initialisation: The GCS readies the UAVs for the
mission—preloading UAVs with flightpaths, roles and other
instructions. The GCS can dynamically initialise UAVs at
any time during a mission—they need not all be initialised
simultaneously.
c) Execution: UAVs perform mission objectives, such as
flying to a specified location and collecting data, such as video.
The operator oversees and controls the fleet from the GCS.
d) Completion: The mission is completed when all
objectives have been met. Some missions may be ongoing,
running indefinitely, and may never finish—such as continuous
surveillance patrols. UAVs may be expected to fly to specified
GPS coordinates upon the completion of a mission or before
their battery is fully depleted.
C. FoD requirements
In order to be deployable for various applications, FoD
systems must support the following five overarching goals:
a) Control: For operational and safety purposes, FoD
systems must come with an appropriate GCS to provide fleet
operators with situational awareness. The corresponding GCS
must at least be able to simultaneously track and control
multiple fleet UAVs throughout the different mission phases
and present real-time status information about individual fleet
UAVs to facilitate operator’s decision-making.
b) Infrastructure: FoD systems must be able to use
provided networking infrastructure for the purpose of com-
munication. Existing infrastructure, such as the wireless APs
on buildings (e.g. for a perimeter patrol), may be exploited
to provide ground-to-air communications. The GCS may
require additional internal infrastructure for serving multiple
workstations for operators to use.
c) Communication: UAVs in a fleet must be able to
communicate with one another and their GCS. UAVs should
forward and route messages for other UAVs and the GCS
through multi-hop communication links, as in Figure 1, to
provide better geographical coverage.
d) Security: To secure fleet operations and to allow for
the use of FoDs for sensitive applications (e.g. surveillance), all
communications within the fleet, including control messages
and application data must be protected. In particular, we require
that all end-to-end communications between the GCS and
UAVs, as well as between individual UAVs if needed, are
mutually authenticated and encrypted to an appropriate standard
where required—with consideration for the possible impact on
UAV performance. All communication channels must therefore
be authenticated, with encryption used for sensitive channels
such as video, status (e.g. current location) and high-level
control. Some channels may not require encryption, such as
low-level joystick control11 (e.g. roll, pitch, yaw and throttle
values).
We assume that UAVs cannot be easily compromised
whilst airborne. In particular, in order to access session-
specific key material the attacker would need to ground and
physically access the drone, which effectively rules out real-
time compromise attacks on the drones participating in the
mission. Despite this, we still require that the compromising
11The current location of the UAV would need to be known as well as
localised conditions such as wind speed and direction to make use of this.
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Figure 2: System architecture for our SFCD approach
of a UAV does not weaken end-to-end channel security for
other UAVs in the fleet and that the GCS must attempt to
find alternative routing paths upon discovering connectivity
issues—an extension of the communication requirement.
e) Performance: For an FoD to be fit-for-purpose, it
must provide sufficient performance, quality of service and
reliability for its applications. In particular, the adopted security
mechanisms should be as lightweight as possible so as to
have minimal impact on the battery power and to allow for
sufficient throughput of payload data (e.g. video). Sensitive
control messages should be delivered with minimal delay,
possibly using appropriate traffic prioritisation mechanisms.
III. SECURED FLEETS OF CONSUMER DRONES—OUR
ENGINEERING APPROACH
In this section, we show how appropriate FoD systems can
be engineered at low cost from traditional COTS drones. Our
solution for SFCD does not require any hardware modifications
and, despite using a particular drone model to demonstrate the
system, the underlying steps and developed building blocks
are platform-agnostic and can be adopted for many other low-
cost COTS drones. Our approach is designed to minimise
changes to the operating system, kernel and other software
components of consumer drones. This is due to the fact that
some platforms may not readily support the changes required
for communicating with other drones or the GCS.
A. Consumer drones suitable for SFCD
Typical low-cost COTS drones supporting video capture and
transmission over ranges of about 200 to 300 metres, with flight
times around 20 to 30 minutes, can be found from 150 to 400
USD. They come with on-board sensors such as gyroscopes,
barometers, accelerometers, GPS, and magnetometers, with
measurements helping to operate and position the drone. These
drones can typically be controlled by a smartphone over Wi-Fi
or through a dedicated R/C controller.
In our solution, we use the popular Parrot Bebop 2 drone.
It is a quadcopter equipped with a dual-core Parrot P7 Cortex
A9 CPU, 8GB onboard flash storage, 3350mAh battery—
providing 30 minutes of flight time—and support for IEEE’s
802.11a/b/g/n/ac networking standards through two aerials (2.4
and 5GHz) with a signal range of 300m. At the moment of
writing, the Parrot Bebop 2 can be purchased for less than 350
USD. This drone is comparable with other drones in the same
price segment such as the DJI Spark12, Yuneec Mantis Q13
and Ryze Tello14.
The Parrot Bebop 2 runs version 3.4.11 of the Linux
kernel and BusyBox15 v1.25.0. The /sbin/broadcom_
setup.sh script is executed on startup and configures the
network adapter, creating the drone’s Wi-Fi AP—to which a
compatible controller, such as a smartphone running Parrot’s
FreeFlight Pro application or a Parrot SkyController16, may
connect. A DHCP server is also started.
B. Configuration changes to network and onboard software
In order to adapt COTS drones for FoD use, some preliminary
changes in configuration will be needed in most cases. In
particular, the original networking setup will require alteration.
This is because, out of the box, COTS drones are often
configured as wireless APs allowing a single controller to
connect and control the drone. COTS drones will not be able
to communicate in a fleet as required with this configuration,
i.e. establish simultaneous connections with the GCS and other
drones in a peer-to-peer manner.
In addition to networking, many COTS drones are equipped
with closed-source autopilot and GCS software (e.g. smartphone
flight applications) which cannot be directly modified for
FoD mission control purposes. It is therefore necessary to
replace them with appropriate software that allows such
modifications. Fortunately, the aforementioned open-source
projects, PaparazziUAV and ArduCopter, can be used on various
COTS drones and replace the original manufacturer’s software
whilst remaining compatible with the drone’s hardware.
In our approach, these steps have been taken for the
Parrot Bebop 2 drones. The original wireless network adapter
(Broadcom BCM43526 802.11a/b/g/n/ac Wireless Adapter) was
configured to support the ad-hoc mode such that the GCS and
all fleet drones can connect to the same ad-hoc network upon
boot. In addition, Parrot’s closed-source autopilot software,
dragon-prog, was replaced with the PaparazziUAV auto-
pilot software, version 5.14.0. The main reason for choosing
PaparazziUAV’s autopilot is that its counterpart GCS software,
unlike other projects, already provides a graphical interface with
status display and controls for multiple drones simultaneously,
a key requirement for FoD mission control.
Compatibility: Our SFCD solution requires that UAVs
participating in the fleet use standard IP networking over
an IEEE 802.11 ad-hoc network. Given that IEEE 802.11
is the de-facto communication standard for many COTS drone
manufacturers, our solution becomes compatible with a wide
range of consumer drones that support Wi-Fi. PaparazziUAV
supports STM32- and LPC21-series microcontrollers, used
12https://www.dji.com/uk/spark
13https://us.yuneec.com/mantis-q
14https://www.ryzerobotics.com/tello
15https://www.busybox.net/
16https://www.parrot.com/uk/support/products/parrot-skycontroller
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by most autopilot boards, as well as Pixhawk and Parrot’s
AR.Drone 2.0, Bebop, Bebop 2 and Rolling Spider17.
Strictly speaking, UAVs are not required to run
PaparazziUAV’s autopilot software. It is possible to use
alternative autopilot software (e.g. ArduCopter) on the drones,
but doing so may require alteration to compatible GCS software
(e.g. QGroundControl) to provide a more fleet-centric GUI for
the monitoring and control of fleets. We use PaparazziUAV
to test our solution as a suitable fleet interface is already
implemented.
We implement a standalone program, the SFCD manager
(see Figure 2), that handles the handshake and the forwarding,
authentication and encryption of packets. It intercepts these
packets from either the GCS or autopilot software and applies
our security protocol—without any changes needing to be made
to the original software on any fleet participant.
C. SFCD multi-hop connectivity and routing
UAVs participating in an SFCD can communicate with other
fleet UAVs and the GCS. Considering UAVs may not be in the
direct range of the GCS or ground infrastructure, a multi-hop
connection through other drones needs to be established where
necessary with appropriate mechanisms for packet routing.
There exists numerous routing protocols that may be suited
to a Flying Ad-hoc Network (FANET). Bekmezci et al. [11]
discuss the features of a FANET when compared to Mobile
Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) and Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
(VANETs), with one of the primary distinctions being the
mobility degree of nodes in a FANET—which affects the
design and effectiveness of protocols. Rosati et al. [12]
present the results of experiments performed using P-OLSR
(Predictive Optimised Link-State Routing) for use in FANETs.
The authors implemented P-OLSR based on an existing OLSR
implementation. Oubbati et al. [13] discuss a number of
approaches to routing in a FANET and the classification of
these approaches, including location-based routing. AODV,
DSDV and OLSR were experimentally analysed by Singh and
Verma [14], with findings suggesting that OLSR outperforms
AODV and DSDV.
Despite this, given that our approach aims to be as
platform-agnostic as possible, many routing protocols cannot
be practically used due to limited platform support of their
implementations, if any such implementations exist. With the
situational awareness of the GCS, including the current and
planned locations and paths of its UAVs and the relatively small
size of our fleets, the additional network and computational
overhead—and implementation time—of a fully-dynamic and
decentralised routing algorithms is not outweighed by its
advantages. Location-based and predictive routing may be
offloaded to the GCS since it has knowledge of the network’s
current and planned future physical topology, which avoids
unnecessary computation on UAVs.
We observe that the use of multi-hop routing may not be
completely avoided since this mechanism allows the fleet to
17http://wiki.paparazziuav.org/wiki/Category:Autopilots
extend its geographic coverage whilst maintaining connectivity
with the GCS. However, the use of multi-hop routing should
be minimised due to the communication bottleneck and the
increased usage of already limited resources (e.g. CPU, battery
power) on consumer UAVs that will be forwarding packets.
Since the GCS has situational awareness about the mission,
including the planned and current location of all drones, coupled
with the assumption that a typical SFCD will consist of up
to few tens of UAVs, it is more practical to avoid the use of
costly ad-hoc routing protocols and adopt an approach where
the corresponding routes are either statically configured or set
dynamically by the GCS and changed on-demand, as part of
the operational mission control.
In our SFCD approach, we adopt application-level routing
where the GCS can set multi-hop routes dynamically so that
each UAV not in direct range of the ground network learns the
next-hop UAV which is responsible for forwarding its packets.
A dedicated routing tag field is reserved in our SFCD packet
format (see Section III-E3) for packets that require multi-hop
routing.
In order to protect multi-hop routing from an outsider who
may attempt to flood the network with packets, the GCS can
securely distribute a fresh path key to all UAVs on a given
path when it sets or updates routes. This path key will be
used by the sending UAV to authenticate its packets and by
every in-path UAV to check validity prior to forwarding the
packet. We stress that path keys are used on top of end-to-
end protection and so an outsider in possession of a path key
would only be able to flood that path with its own packets
but not to compromise the end-to-end security between the
fleet UAVs and the GCS. Besides, as already mentioned, the
attacker would need to ground and physically access the UAV
in order to obtain the current path key from the drone’s volatile
memory. In this case GCS will no longer receive the expected
regular status messages from the affected UAVs and can take
measures to remove them from the ongoing mission and update
the affected path key for the remaining UAVs. After a timeout
specified in mission parameters, GCS can attempt to discover
an alternative route to the remaining UAVs. If unsuccessful,
UAVs may be configured to fly to specified coordinates or their
launch location after not receiving control messages from the
GCS for a specified duration.
D. SFCD communication channels
For PaparazziUAV’s autopilot and GCS software, UDP is
used to send commands to UAVs and to receive regular status
updates in the PPRZLINK format. Status updates are on average
55–108 bytes, with control around 50–68 bytes. Low-level
joystick values sent to the UAV are 14 bytes long. These
channels form the unidirectional telemetry (status) and datalink
(control) channels between the GCS and UAVs. With our
packet format in Section III-E3, some unavoidable overhead
is introduced in authenticating and securing these channels.
Enabling video streaming for both the bottom and
front-facing cameras on the Parrot Bebop 2 drone, with
PaparazziUAV’s default quality settings, results in RTP packets
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of size 298–342 bytes at 5 FPS and 1054–1462 bytes at 5 FPS,
respectively. Scaling, compression and FPS parameters may
be adjusted to give improved quality or latency. This forms
another unidirectional communication channel between a video
stream viewer on the GCS and the video transmission software
on the UAV. UAVs equipped with other sensors of use for a
given use case may be configured to stream readings on other
data stream channels.
E. Securing SFCD communication channels
The aforementioned communication channels must be suf-
ficiently secured to allow the use of SFCD in sensitive
applications. The adopted security mechanisms need to be
lightweight in order to have minimal impact on the limited
resources of consumer drones.
Given the online presence of the GCS for the entire
SFCD mission duration and the relatively small number of
participating UAVs, we base our security approach on the
efficient on-demand key distribution technique using symmetric
cryptography. In particular, we consider GCS as a key distri-
bution centre with individually preshared independent master
keys between the GCS and each UAV. Upon initialisation of
each drone, a lightweight handshake protocol will be executed
to establish fresh session keys for each communication channel
needed between the GCS and the UAV. If at some point the
application requires two drones to have end-to-end secure
communication, both drones will receive a fresh shared key
from the GCS over their established secure channels and run
the same handshake protocol with each other to establish their
own secure channel(s). Similarly, to protect application-layer
routing against flooding attacks as discussed in Section III-C,
if the GCS dynamically sets a multi-hop route for a new UAV,
then this UAV and all UAVs on its path to the GCS will receive
a fresh path key from the GCS over the established secure
channels.
1) SFCD Handshake: Our SFCD handshake builds on the
provably secure lightweight MAP1 protocol from [5], enriched
with information related to the identities of communicating
parties (e.g. GCS, UAVs), derivation of various SFCD-specific
channel keys, and additional public parameters such as mission
and session IDs, and verified using Scyther18. As proven in [5]
this protocol offers mutual authentication and secure session
key establishment. The protocol is executed over TCP which
provides reliability and correct ordering and is essential for the
handshake to be completed successfully—UDP would require
additional application-layer error and retransmission handling.
The SFCD handshake protocol is executed between two
parties, an initiator A and responder B. In the context of SFCD,
for GCS-to-UAV communications, the initiator role will be
taken by the GCS, whereas for UAV-to-UAV communications,
any UAV can serve as the initiator.
It is assumed that prior to the protocol execution both parties
are initialised with a secure preshared key KAB ∈ {0, 1}κ for
a suitable security parameter κ. Note that preshared keys for
18https://people.cispa.io/cas.cremers/scyther/
GCS-to-UAV communications may be uploaded securely on
the UAVs over a wired USB connection during the setup
procedure (e.g. during the changes to network and on-board
software configurations), whereas for UAV-to-UAV they can be
distributed on demand to both UAVs by the GCS over active
end-to-end secure channels.
The SFCD handshake protocol uses standard cryptographic
building blocks. An unforgeable message authentication code
MAC : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}κ for mutual authentication
of parties, a secure key derivation function KDF : {0, 1}κ ×
{0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}κ for deriving session and channel-specific
keys, and a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}κ
for computing the protocol transcript-dependent session ID.
The mission ID, mID , used in the protocol is assumed to be
chosen by the GCS for the entire mission and sent to each UAV
in that mission as part of the first protocol message. It will
be used by all UAVs participating in the same mission upon
execution of further handshake protocols for their UAV-to-UAV
communications.
The SFCD handshake involves three communication rounds
with final key derivation step as specified in the following:
Communication:
1. A picks its nonce NA ∈ {0, 1}κ and sends (A,NA,
mID) to B.
2. B picks its nonce NB ∈ {0, 1}κ, computes
µB = MAC(KAB , B‖A‖NB‖NA‖mID), and sends
(B,NB , µB) to A.
3. If µB verifies, A sends µA = MAC(KAB , A‖B‖NA‖
NB‖mID) to B and proceeds with step 5.
4. If µA verifies, B proceeds with step 5.
Key derivation:
5. Compute the session ID sID = H(A‖B‖NA‖NB‖mID).
For each channel ID c, derive the corresponding channel
key Kc = KDF(KAB , A‖B‖NA‖NB‖mID‖c).
Note that a different constant c is used to derive each channel
key Kc. It is assumed that both parties share knowledge about
channels that they need to create.
In our implementation of SFCD handshake, we adopt 256-
bit preshared master keys and use the very efficient BLAKE2
construction [15] to instantiate H and KDF. Our KDF produces
256-bit channel keys based on the preshared key KAB . We
use BLAKE2 and truncate its output to obtain the 8-bit sID .
Nonces NA and NB are 128 bits long, giving a combined
entropy of 256 bits for the handshake. For the MAC we
adopt HMAC-SHA512-256. These instantiations are known to
provide sufficient security for the cryptographic building blocks
that they represent. Our SFCD code uses the popular libsodium
cryptography library that provides the required implementations,
with faster primitives19, and can be easily ported to different
platforms. In particular, its cross-compatibility makes it a good
candidate for a SFCD, which may employ a variety of UAV
models.
19https://download.libsodium.org/doc/
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Table I: SFCD packet format
Field Size
Src ID 1 byte
Dest ID 1 byte
Mission ID 1 byte
Type 1 byte
Session ID 1 byte
Seq No 3 bytes
Payload —
MAC tag 32 bytes
Routing tag (multi-hop packets only) 32 bytes
2) Protecting SFCD channels: Each session-specific channel
key Kc derived in the SFCD handshake protocol protects
packets that will be exchanged over the corresponding channel
c. For SFCD channel protection, we adopt the standard
approach based on authenticated encryption with associated
data (AEAD) [16]. In our SFCD construction we instantiate
AEAD using ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 for MAC
as specified in [10] and implemented in the libsodium library.
This combination provably offers 256-bit security [17] and its
efficiency is particularly well suited for SFCD communications.
All end-to-end channels in SFCD require authentication,
but payload encryption may be optional in some cases. The
above AEAD approach allows both requirements to be achieved
depending on the needs of the channel. Each SFCD packet
header is treated as associated data and will be authenticated
by default. For the packet data, authentication is always in
place, with optional encryption, and is fixed for each channel
in advance.
3) Structure of SFCD packets: Our SFCD approach proposes
the use of a single packet format (as defined in Table I) for the
protection of all data sent on any channel that is established
following the handshake, in all GCS-to-UAV and UAV-to-UAV
communications. This has advantage that the same protection
mechanism and packet encapsulation method can be used across
all channels and types of data. The packet format primarily
acts as a wrapper to add authentication and optional encryption
for packets that would normally be transmitted without either.
Our SFCD packet structure allows for 255 active drones in
a single mission (one reserved for the GCS). It includes the
mission ID, mID , to distinguish between up to 256 missions
that may be simultaneously taking place on the same network—
requiring only one NIC as a minimum on the GCS. This allows
the GCS to run multiple instances of its control software for
different mission IDs if necessary—this may be on multiple
workstations with individual operators, for example. Full bytes
are used when identifying missions and UAVs to allow for a
more straightforward implementation and future-proofing.
The type field indicates the payload type, or communication
channel, such as video, status update (telemetry) or control
(datalink). It may be used to prioritise routing, with up to 256
types possible. The type field is used to identify the channel
key Kc required for processing the packet.
The session ID field, which contains the 8-bit sID computed
during the SFCD handshake protocol, will be checked by the
recipient before it starts processing the received packet.
After completion of the handshake and establishment of the
secure channels, the MAC tag will always contain the MAC
value computed using AEAD over the packet header and the
payload field. The payload is encrypted for sensitive channels
as defined in the mission parameters—usually expected to be
video, status, and control channels.
We observe that our SFCD packet format adds 40 bytes
of overhead, mainly due to the use of the MAC field, to all
packets exchanged between GCS and UAVs that are in its
direct range. Packets that must be routed via other UAVs in a
multi-hop fashion have 72 bytes of overhead due to the use of
the additional routing tag for verified routing.
The routing tag is needed only for packets that must be
routed along some multi-hop path between the GCS and some
UAV that is not in the direct range of the ground network
(see Section III-C). If present, the routing tag contains a MAC
value computed by the sender using the path key distributed
earlier by the GCS and known to all UAVs on the path. The
receiving UAV will verify the tag before forwarding the packet.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND
REAL-TIME STREAMING
In this section, we evaluate performance of our implemented
SFCD solution in practice using Parrot Bebop 2 drones. Our
experiments cover the impact of the implemented security
mechanisms on the power consumption of the drones and
their communication performance within the fleet and with the
GCS. We use the obtained results to analyse suitability of our
SFCD approach for FoD applications that require real-time
monitoring/surveillance.
A. Battery power consumption and flight time
The impact of our SFCD approach on battery power is
evaluated by comparing voltages over time for a Parrot Bebop
2 drone running PaparazziUAV software with and without our
SFCD security mechanisms. We note that the manufacturer’s
flight time for the 3350mAh battery is claimed to be up to 30
minutes20 and that as soon as the battery output drops to 8–9V,
the drone turns off.
Our power consumption experiments are based on the worst-
case scenario where PaparazziUAV software on the Parrot
Bebop 2 drone streams front-facing camera video at default
quality whilst running the drone at full throttle. The results
presented in Figure 3a show changes in power consumption
measured on a single drone handling its own packets—that is,
the verification and decryption of incoming packets and the
encryption and signing of outgoing packets. We observe that
our SFCD implementation impacts flight time by a maximum
of 1.56 minutes, resulting in a 9.9% reduction in comparison
to the original flight time. Note that as voltages in Figure 3a
are measured for the drone at full throttle, the resulting running
time is shorter than claimed by the manufacturer. The 9.9%
reduction equates to 27 minutes of normal flight, where throttle
20https://www.parrot.com/us/spareparts/drones/
power-battery-bebop-2-power
8
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
9
10
11
12
13
Time (minutes)
Vo
lta
ge
(V
)
PaparazziUAV only
With SFCD Manager
(a) Power consumption comparison between PaparazziUAV on its own
and PaparazziUAV with SFCD Manager running—with full throttle
and front camera streaming at default quality
0 50 100 150 200 250
4
6
8
10
12
Distance (m)
B
an
dw
id
th
(M
ib
it/
s)
(b) Drone-to-drone bandwidth measurements as distance increases
Figure 3: SFCD with Parrot Bebop 2 drones—battery power consumption and bandwidth over distance
is not constantly maxed, based on the manufacturer’s estimated
flight time of 30 minutes.
As not all drones in the fleet would be required to stream
video for surveillance applications, we expect that this maximal
reduction in flight time would affect only drones that are
tasked with streaming. We also note that drones tasked with
forwarding packets on a multi-hop path would be required to
verify routing tags, which would have similar impact on their
power consumption compared to the verification of incoming
packets addressed directly to the drone.
B. Communication performance over distance
The impact of our SFCD implementation on the bandwidth
(data throughput) is estimated based on the measurements
affecting drone-to-drone communication links only since the
networking equipment of the GCS can be easily upgraded
to be at least as powerful as the limited and non-upgradable
COTS drone components. Our bandwidth measurements were
obtained using iperf321 on a communication link between
two Parrot Bebop 2 drones secured with our SFCD solution.
We note that the actual time for setting up a secure SFCD
channel between the drone using SFCD handshake protocol
(see Section III-E1) took 6–7ms on average to be completed.
The obtained bandwidth measurements over an SFCD-
protected communication link are plotted in Figure 3b in
dependency of the distance between two drones. Tests were
carried out every 10m with a drone distance from 0m to 260m—
after which point, the iperf3 client could not connect to the
server and no packets were successfully returned with nping22.
21https://iperf.fr/
22https://nmap.org/nping/
In our experiments, network latencies based on measured round-
trip times with nping remained within 1 to 3ms, with all
packets delivered and returned successfully.
As an outcome, the SFCD-protected communication links
can support throughputs of up to 12.5Mibit/s. As the distance
between the drones increases, the available bandwidth on their
communication link decreases on average by 0.03Mibit/s/m.
The maximum distance for an SFCD-protected communication
link between two Parrot Bebop 2 drones can reach up to 260m—
with line-of-sight and no other Wi-Fi channels in use nearby.
Due to the rapid signal degradation from 260m onwards, no
connection was observed between the two drones at 270m—
before 260m, no packet loss was observed within the testable
range.
The optimal topology for covering the largest geographical
area is a star, where an AP for the GCS is centrally positioned,
with drones 260m away from this AP concentrically. In
order to cover the furthest distance, a line of drones at
their maximal distance is required. The worst bandwidth
measurement of 4.7Mibit/s, at the furthest distance of 260m,
easily accommodates the data requirements of drones streaming
video and telemetry at their default rate, as discussed in the
following section.
C. Impact on applications requiring real-time streaming
In the following, we study the implications of our ex-
perimental SFCD performance evaluation in FoD applica-
tions related to monitoring/surveillance—where real-time data
streaming from FoD to the GCS is of particular importance.
Our analysis is based on video streaming at a resolution of
288× 200 at 5 FPS, which is PaparazziUAV’s default for the
front-facing camera on the Parrot Bebop 2. The lower bound
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of 4.7Mibit/s allows for a considerable increases in resolution
if required. Streaming video at this quality, with a packet size
of 1054–1462 bytes plus 40 bytes (or 72 for packets sent
on multi-hop routes) for our packet format, gives an upper
bound of (5 · (1462+ 40))÷ 128 = 58.67Kibit/s (or 59.92 for
multi-hop packets) for a single video stream. The observed
bandwidth of a single connectivity link, 4.7–12.5Mibit/s, may
handle theoretically 82 such video streams.
As the number of nodes on a multi-hop path increases,
so will the packet latency—provided the none of bandwidth
constraints on the path are exceeded. The average round-trip
time for small ‘ping’ packets was 3ms, resulting in a 1.5ms
penalty per hop for a unidirectional data stream. This gives
an indication of the video or manual control latency that may
be experienced for large fleets incorporating multi-hop packet
forwarding. Additionally, the battery consumption of the drones
providing such paths will be further impacted as in Figure 3a.
For each drone providing a communication link to others, an
additional 9.9% reduction in flight time is expected for every
other drone it serves. A drone forwarding packets for the GCS
and other drones may be required to throttle its processing of
packets to ensure it can maintain steady flightstack processing
if airborne.
Communication links within our SFCD may easily handle
the default-quality video streams of many drones, with the
worst bandwidth performance of any single link measured to
be 4.7Mibit/s. However, the battery performance of drones
providing mutli-hop connectivity will be impacted by around
9.9% for each drone served. It is recommended that no more
than three hops are present, or equivalently, no drone serves
more than three others, as the flight time of the drone providing
the connection to the GCS’s AP will be adversely impacted.
We suggest that our solution is well-suited to semi-automated
surveillance or monitoring due to the reasonable bandwidths
available, the limited performance of full manual control (e.g.
joystick input), and the possibility to extend distances beyond
260m—up to 1040m if using three hops.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we described our engineering approach for
building secure fleets based on low-cost off-the-shelf consumer
drones. Our SFCD solution is modular and does not require
extensive or intrusive changes to the consumer drones. We
considered not only security in fleet communications but
also issues around multi-hop routing, mission control and
monitoring of fleet drones, offering a holistic approach to
allow businesses, or even individual users, to adopt affordable
small fleets of drones for their use cases.
Our SFCD system is designed with the limitations of
consumer drones in mind, particularly their flight time per-
formance, which results in a carefully-considered trade-off
between security, network and communication performance.
Consumer drones are more attractive due to their reduced
cost, but inherently cannot provide the same performance as
expensive commercial or bespoke solutions—a compromise
between cost and quality.
We exploit the online and central nature of the GCS to
provide centralised routing management and key distribu-
tion, resulting in the use of more efficient symmetric-key
cryptography throughout. The SFCD handshake presented in
Section III-E1 allows for an arbitrary number of channels to be
configured and created within the fleet, between drones and the
GCS, as well as between drone pairs, with data authenticated
and encrypted (where required) based on derived keys. The
proposed SFCD packet format allows for up to 255 drones in
a single mission, with a fleet supporting up to 256 missions at
a time.
We demonstrated experimentally that our SFCD system
achieves reasonable performance when used with low-cost
consumer drones such as Parrot Bebop 2, showing only a 9.9%
reduction in flight time and bandwidths of at least 4.7Mibit/s
at distances up to 260m—which may be further extended using
the discussed multi-hop routing approach. This makes the
proposed system suitable for applications involving real-time
surveillance/monitoring of geographic areas spanning several
square kilometres with a few tens of drones.
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